

26 May 1978 *1130*

Meeting of the I & W Working Group, 25 May 78, 2-4 PM

1. Attending: Lehman, [redacted]

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3. Two papers were circulated at the meeting (both are attached):

a. [redacted] handed out a list, Proposed Duties and Responsibilities of the Senior Assistant for Warning and Crisis, listing six major functions.

b. [redacted] gave out a short paper, Objections to Special Assistant for W & CM, listing six of his specific objections.

4. [redacted] went over a flow chart that he had produced. [redacted] requested that a copy (a flow chart) be made available with the next draft of the proposal.

5. During the meeting, [redacted] continued to state his objections to the proposal for a Senior Assistant (SA); these are covered in the notes of the meeting of 24 May as well as in his paper mentioned in 3b above. [redacted] believes that the DCI receives real clout and authority, under PD 17 and 12036, for collection and tasking, and he thinks he has this authority. [redacted] argues for a warning mechanism working within existing command lines (NFAC and NITC) without adding additional staff functions. He believes that this solution would meet the criticism of the warning structure. Lehman -- backed up by [redacted] -- strongly disagreed, saying that, to meet this criticism, particularly in the House Committee letter, the DCI has to make tangible, new proposals. The proposal for an SA does accomplish this; the DCI can say that he has delegated this vital function to the DDCI, and has provided the DDCI with a full-time senior assistant to help him focus on the problems.

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25X1 6. [ ] commented that he and [ ] were both very much split in their views, and that NITC would try to come up soon with an agreed position; they would try to meet soon with [ ] and Shackley to sort this out. 25X1

25X1 7. We then shifted to a general discussion of the role of SWS. [ ] repeated his criticism of the SWS; he has grave reservations as to its effectiveness. He believes that this proposal is only a Band-aid approach, and that major surgery is required. He disagrees heartily with the thought that SWS is a central node in any warning system. He sees a real problem in staffing SWS; community offices "outplace" unwanted people to the staff. He believes that good analysts should be selected and used in long term research for three year tours. [ ] defended the SWS as worthwhile, although he also believes that it can be improved and should be broadened. It will be able to help the S.A. in keeping him informed. He stressed the need for the SWS to play a real doubting, challenging, Devil's Advocate role in the community. He cited one example -- recent indications of possible increases in pressure against Berlin, where SWS really fulfilled its needling role. SWS produced a memo, ORPA drafted critical comments, and the whole matter came to the attention of the NSC staffers. Even though the Soviets did not move, appropriate attention was focused on the danger that they might. [ ] stressed this need for an independent, contemplative look, the idea that SWS could act as an energizer, a catalyst. In many cases, SWS would act in conjunction with an NIO, in other matters it would clearly yield to the NIO's primacy. [ ] also stressed that SWS analysts maintain consistently good contacts within the community. 25X1 25X1

8. There was some further discussion of the need to maintain the community aura in any warning and crisis apparatus. Lehman listed community aspects contained in the current proposal:

a. The overall structure of the Steering Group.

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b. The possibility of a military or non-CIA deputy to the S.A.

c. The location of the SWS at the Pentagon.

d. The community makeup of the SWS.

e. The community role of the NIO in warning and crisis.

f. The furthering of the link to the community through reinstitution of the "warning referents" in each community element -- acting as I & W "missionaries" and needlers.

Dick Lehman pointed out that no final decision should be made yet on the role and the future of SWS; the other aspects of the system should first fall into place.

9. The group then turned to a discussion of Task Forces during crises. It was agreed that there must be some national aspect to the task force sitrep turned out at Langley, but one cannot just dub a sitrep "national" when it really is not. At the same time, it is not practical to decide arbitrarily that a task force should be located at the CCF in the Pentagon, for example, and then expect NFAC to send its key analysts over there, away from their own informational base. A task force is the tip of the analytical iceberg; away from his home base an analyst would lose perhaps 50% of his potential. [ ] pointed out that the improved new methods of communications linking operations centers enable better exchanges of information among the various task forces; thus in effect obviating the need for moving analysts around to unfamiliar surroundings. He also suggested that we not be bothered by trying to label a sitrep "national". Why not just call it the DCI's Sitrep? The DCI would publish it, just as he does the NID; it is an NFAC product largely, but it has community coordination where the time and the situation permit. Dissent should always still be included, rather than having some sort of weak committeeized consensus.

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10. [ ] raised one point at the close of the meeting, to the effect that the meetings held by NIO's to review possible warning situations should

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25X1 be held more frequently than once per month. It was generally agreed that they should be periodic and frequent, according to the requirement of the situation. [ ] commented that the report issued after these groups met should be the NIO's report; and that the NIO could and should reflect dissents.

11. Dick Lehman said that the specific deadline for issuing the group's report had been lifted, but that he still aimed to move ahead quickly. He will aim for completion of a new draft early next week, and will set the time of the next meeting next week as well. He will also provide for the possibility of some sort of dissent in the paper.



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PROPOSED DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF THE  
SENIOR ASSISTANT FOR WARNING AND CRISIS

1. Serve as a focal point for community problems, suggestions and complaints concerning the DCI's role in the field of indications & warning/crisis management. He would use the various existing community organizations and mechanisms unless patently lacking.
2. Instill and promote "second" look philosophy on part of community analysts, through command channels. Provide occasional forums for discussions of indications & warning/crisis management issues, ideas and idea exchange.
3. Maintain contact with NIOs, NITOs on alerting memorandum and during periods of impending crisis, actual crisis periods and assist the DDCI in analyzing crisis experience.
4. Encourage and promote better warning and crisis procedures and technology aimed at better integration and utilization of community wide warning and crisis facilities.
5. Oversee the operation of the Strategic Warning Staff replacing the present Special Assistant for Warning now at DIA.
6. Serve as Executive Secretary to the committee on warning and crisis.

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Objections to Special Assistant for W&CM

- creates an unnecessary layer between the DCI/DDCI and his principal operating officers (NI & CT)
- as a staff rather than line officer, would not have the executive authority to get the job done
- if given the necessary authority, it would be at the expense of NI and CT who now have it, thereby creating unnecessary competition and confusion as to who is in charge at various times
- as proposed, the Special Assistant would not be viewed as a Community official outside of CIA and, therefore, would not get the necessary responsiveness, particularly from DoD
- the SA would require a professional staff which, albeit smaller, would duplicate those of NFAC and NITC
- the NIOs are or should be doing much of what the SA would be tasked with

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